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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR FACTUAL
COMPILATIONS AFTER FEIST: A
PRACTITIONER'S VIEW*
David 0. Carson**
It is a pleasure and a rare opportunity for a lawyer in private practice to be able to set aside some time to exchange ideas with scholars
and other experts in his chosen field. It is also a challenge because the
practitioner's focus is usually on a particular, fact-specific problem that
a particular client has come to him to resolve. Fortunately, the larger
policy issues that are the subject of this symposium are issues that have
a major impact on a copyright lawyer's practice-so we have, one
hopes, a happy marriage between the scholarly concerns of this gathering and the practical concerns of business.
The timing of this symposium is particularly conducive to such a
marriage. The decision earlier this year in Feist Publications v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.1 has provoked considerable discussion and some
consternation in the copyright community. The consternation is particularly evident among publishers of factual compilations and databases.
Feist has raised serious questions regarding the availability of copyright protection for fact works, leading some to wonder whether the sky
is indeed falling. Legal scholars at this symposium have presented serious proposals designed to pick up the pieces that Feist left scattered in
its wake, and frequently those proposals amount to a massive overhaul
of our system of copyright protection.
From the practitioner's perspective, such proposals may be premature. It is not yet clear whether Feist represents a sea change in the law
of copyright-or to what degree. The dust is still settling in its aftermath, and thus far there is some reason to hope that as a practical
matter, publishers of most databases and factual compilations will still
find themselves on familiar terrain in the post-Feist world. It is submitted that there is still some question whether the sky is really falling for,
such publishers.
Some participants in this symposium undoubtedly welcome Feist
as a corrective measure that casts aside an ill-advised tradition of overprotection for fact works. Others, including this author, are troubled by
© 1991 David 0. Carson.
Partner, Schwab Goldberg Price & Dannay, New York City, J.D., 1981, Harvard Law
School (cum laude); M.A., 1974, Stanford University; B.A., 1973 Stanford University.
1. III S. Ct. 1282 (interim ed. 1991).
*

**

Published by eCommons, 1991

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:3

the Court's apparent willingness to address issues that did not need to
be addressed in a manner that may indicate a lack of sensitivity to the
importance of certain segments of our "copyright industries."
What we should-at first glance-be able to agree on -is that
whether we like it or not, Feist is now the law of the land. But on
reflection, even that is'not necessarily a simple proposition. It begs the
question: What is the law that was announced in Feist? Moreover,
2
there are some who hope that Feist did not really mean what it said. If
the handful of post-Feist decisions in the lower courts are any indication, predictions of the death of copyright for compilations may be a
little too hasty.
Thus, the thesis of this essay is that those who welcome Feist as a
revolutionary transformation of the realm of copyright-as well as
those who decry Feist as the beginning of the end for publishers of fact
works-may be premature. Ultimately, Feist and its progeny may indeed meet such expectations, but it would be prudent to wait a decent
interval before we bury the alleged victims.
A corollary to this thesis is that those who call for fundamental
changes in our system of copyright or other legal protection for factbased works cannot and should not assume that Feist requires such
changes; nor do their prescriptions to remedy the alleged ills of our
copyright system necessarily stand on their own merits. If one believes-as this author does-that the current system has served us well
and can continue to do so, then there is no reason to abandon it precipitously. Therefore, the suggestions that we need to overhaul our system
of copyright protection for factual works should not be viewed as necessary responses to a dilemma created by Feist. Rather, they must be
examined on their own merits. As one whose clients include publishers
of the types of works that would be affected-generally adversely-by
such proposals, this author is skeptical of the need to restructure a system that has not been shown to need it. But such hesitation is motivated by more than a proprietary stake in the pre-Feist system. The
fact is that the copyright system that has been in place thus far appears
to have successfully encouraged the development of a thriving information industry that has made knowledge accessible to the public in exactly the way the framers of the Copyright Clause must have intended.

2. This author may be among the latter group. Professor Karjala also appears to place himself in this category, choosing or hoping to believe that Feist's statements on constitutional aspects
of copyright are mere dicta. Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Misappropriation, 17 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 885 (1992). One can sympathize with this reading of Feist, but it may be a risky proposition to wager that the Court did not mean what it literally went out of its way to say. Professor
Raskind may be more realistic-and pessimistic-in taking the Court's words seriously. Leo J.
Raskind, Assessing the Impact of Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331 (1992).
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I. FEIST
It is assumed that there is no need to recapitulate the facts of
Feist at length to this audience. Feist was a case of alleged infringement of the copyright in a white pages telephone directory. The lower
courts had found infringement; the Supreme Court reversed, ruling
that the .white pages are not copyrightable. The result is hardly remarkable, although it overturned precedent that had prevailed in a minority of circuits and had been rejected by even more circuits. "Sweat
of the brow" (or "industrious collection")-the doctrine that had long
been used to justify copyright for simple directories-had been a troubling doctrine even for many of those who espoused it. It was seen as an
exception to the normal rules governing copyrightability.3
What is remarkable about Feist is the route the Court took to
reach its destination. Although there was ample reason to reject Rural
Telephone's claim of copyright on purely statutory grounds-and the
Court did so--the Court also held (apparently gratuitously) that the
white pages could not pass muster on constitutional grounds as well.
And having held that the white pages were doubly condemned to the
public domain, the Court went on to offer its observations (again, apparently gratuitously) about how to determine whether a copyrightable
factual compilation has been infringed.
It is difficult to quarrel with the Court's ruling insofar as it was
based on statutory grounds. The copyright asserted in the white pages
was justified as a compilation. But a "compilation" is defined by the
Copyright Act as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an
original work of authorship."' It is the selection, coordination or arrangement of the material that is copyrightable-not the material itself.' Feist recognized that the copyright statute requires that a compilation include an original selection, coordination or arrangement of
material in order to qualify for copyright protection, and that such pro-

3. See Miller v. Universal Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1364, 1370 (5th Cir. 1981) (Directory
cases may be viewed as being "in a category by themselves." The special protection granted directories "has generally not been applied to other factual endeavors.").
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (emphasis added).
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988). Section 103(b) states:
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed
by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the
work, and does not imply any exclusive rigfit in the preexisting material. The copyright in
such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership,
or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material.
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tection does not extend to the underlying facts.6 Other courts previously
had come to the same conclusion. 7 Feist concluded that there is nothing
original in the selection, coordination or arrangement of the white
pages of a telephone book, which are "entirely typical," "garden-variety" and "devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity." 8 The Court
concluded that "Rural's white pages, limited to basic subscriber information and arranged alphabetically, fall short of the mark." 9 Because
Section 101 of title 17 of the United States Code "does not afford protection from copying to a collection of facts that are selected, coordinated and arranged in a way that utterly lacks originality," the white
pages failed to meet the statutory requirements for copyright.1"
There was no reason for the Court to say more. But the bulk of
the Court's opinion-which preceded its statutory analysis-addressed
constitutional issues. The Court's unnecessary ruling on constitutional
grounds would surprise those who agree with Justice O'Connor's recent
dissent in Rust v. Sullivan1 -the recent case upholding federal restrictions on abortion counselling in federally-funded health care facilities.
In Rust, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to such restrictions and held that they did not violate the First Amendment. Justice O'Connor dissented, arguing that the Court never should have
reached the First Amendment issue. She stated that the Court has a
"time-honored practice of not reaching constitutional questions unnecessarily .

. .

. 'It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint . . . that

this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them."'""
Justice O'Connor's view did not prevail in Feist, which is curious
because Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion in Feist. There is no hint
in the Feist decision why the Court felt it necessary to address the
constitutional issues, and it is a little puzzling that it did, because the
Court made it clear that Rural's white pages were not copyrightable
under the copyright statute.
Before Feist, it had been generally understood that copyright protects only works that are "original," but the "originality" requirement
was understood to have a fairly low threshold, requiring only that the
work be independently created. Indeed, Nimmer's latest (but post6. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Ill S. Ct. 1282, 1295 (interim ed. 1991).
7. See, e.g., Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1989);
Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1984).
8. Feist, III S. Ct. at 1296.
9. Id. at 1297.
10. Id.
11. III S. Ct. 1759 (interim ed. 1991).
12. Id. at 1788 (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984)).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/19
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Feist) edition states that "it is now clearly established, both as a matter
of congressional intent and judicial construction, that the originality
necessary to support a copyright merely calls for independent creation,
copnot novelty."" a If the work originated with its author and was 1not
4
ied from another work, it was understood to be copyrightable.
The Supreme Court seemed to add a new element in Feist: in addition to being independently created, a work must also have a "modicum of creativity." 5 Until Feist, creativity was a term rarely encountered in discussions of the requirements for copyright," and on the rare
occasions when it was used, it appeared to mean little more than independent creation or a very modest degree of intellectual labor.17 Moreover, creativity does not appear to have been considered a constitutional requirement.
Justice O'Connor considered creativity to be an ingredient of originality, which is generally accepted as a constitutional requirement. 8
Her source for a creativity requirement was the century-old TradeMark Cases,19 where the Court had invalidated the first federal trademark act because the Copyright Clause could not serve as a basis for
federal legislation in the field of trademarks. Justice O'Connor read
The Trade-Mark Cases as stating that "originality requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity." 20 The source for this con-

13. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §2.01 [A], at 2-7
(1991).
14. Id.; see Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir.
1951).
15. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1296 (interim ed.
1991) (emphasis added).
16. In Kregos v. The Associated Press, the Second Circuit claimed that "[prior to Feist,
we had applied these principles to require some minimal level of creativity in two fairly recent
...
937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991). The court was
cases that illustrate compilations of facts.
referring to Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984) and FinancialInformation, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Service, 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820
(1987). In fact, neither case had expressly required creativity. In Eckes, the court had r-marked
that "[w]e have no doubt that appellants exercised selection, creativity and judgment in choosing"
the baseball cards to be included in their compilation, but nowhere did the court state that creativity was a requirement for copyright. Eckes, 736 F.2d at 863. Rather, the court observed that to
qualify for copyright a work must constitute an original work of authorship and concluded that
subjective selection and arrangement merit protection. Id. at 862. In Financial Information, the
only mention of creativity was its quotation of the foregoing passage from Eckes. FinancialInfo.,
at 207. The court's analysis of originality focussed on "independent creation," not creativity. Id. at
207-08.
17. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir. 1975).
18. See I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 1.06.
19. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
20. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Ill S. Ct. 1282, 1288 (interim ed.
1991). by eCommons, 1991
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clusion was a passage in The Trade-Mark Cases stating that the word
"writings" in the Copyright Clause is to be liberally construed, but includes only works that are "original, and are founded in the creative
powers of the mind. The writings which are to be protected are the
fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like." 2
Justice O'Connor's only other source for a constitutional requirement of creativity was another century-old case-Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony2 2-where the Court had upheld the copyrightability of photographs. There the Court had defined an "author" as "he
to whom anything owes its origin" and had, in Justice O'Connor's view,
"emphasized the creative component of originality," describing copyright as being limited to (in the words of Burrow-Giles) "original intellectual conceptions of the author" and requiring "the existence of those
facts of originality, of intellectual production, of thought, and
conception. '"23
It is submitted that these two authorities are very shaky foundations for a constitutional requirement of "creativity." The Trade-Mark
Cases appeared to see the "creative powers of the mind"' as nothing
more than "intellectual labor, ' 2 5 and Burrow-Giles did not even use the
term "creativity" or "creative," but also seemed to focus on intellectual
labor. To the degree that there is any requirement of "creativity" to be
found in these cases, it is a very modest one indeed. In fact, this modest
requirement could arguably include the intellectual labor that constituted "sweat of the brow"-the very standard that Feist rejected.
But perhaps one need not dwell greatly on Feist's exposition of a
requirement of creativity, for Feist itself admits that the requirement is
extremely modest. It repeatedly observes that a "minimal degree of
creativity"" or a "modicum of creativity" 27 is sufficient. However, it
also stated that "more than a de minimis quantum of creativity" is
required. 8 The Court also allowed that although originality or creativity obviously cannot be found in the facts themselves, factual compilations may meet the originality requirement by choosing which facts to
include, determining what order to place them in, and arranging them
so that they may be used effectively by readers-i.e., selection, coordi-.
21. Id. (citing United States v. Steffens (The Trade-Mark Cases), 100 U.S. at 94 (1879).
22. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
23. Feist. 11I S. Ct. at 1288 (quoting Burrows-Giles, 11I U.S. at 58, 59-60).
24. 100 U.S. at 94.
25. Id.
26. Feist, 11I S. Ct. at 1289, 1296; see also id. at 1294 ("minimal level of creativity"); id.
at 1297 ("minimal creative spark").
27. Id. at 1288, 1296.
28. Id. at 1297.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/19
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nation and arrangement, the statutory requirements for compilations.
The Court concluded that "these choices of selection and arrangement,
so long as they are made independently by the compiler and entail a
minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress
may protect such compilations through the copyright laws." 2 9 However,
the Court warned that such protection extends only to those components of the work that are original to the author-that is, to the author's original selection and arrangement of the facts, and not to the
facts themselves.
A major problem with the white pages, as with most compilations,
is that it is simply a collection of facts. And as Feist notes, it has long
been understood that facts are not copyrightable because, as the court
pointed out, facts have no author. As the Court stated, the distinction
is between creation and discovery: The first person to find and report a
particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered
its existence. Hence, the requirement of originality and creativity is
missing.
Itis for this reason that the Court concluded that the "sweat of
the brow" doctrine failed to meet the constitutional requirements because it extended copyright protection beyond selection and arrangement-which the Court described as the compiler's original contributions-to include protection of the facts themselves.
If this were all that Feist had said about copyright protection for
factual compilations, publishers of such compilations might breathe
easily. Most compilations would appear to qualify for copyright protection under this standard. Indeed, that was acknowledged by the Court:
"Presumably, the vast majority of compilations will pass this test, but
not all will. There remains a narrow category of works in which the
creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent."3 0 But the Court's acknowledgement that it was not disqualifying
most compilations from protection may offer little peace of mind to
those who notice the reference to "creative spark" in the next sentence.
Other disturbing passages include the Court's dismissal of the selection
of listings in Rural's white pages as one that "could not be more obvious" 3 1-a term we are more accustomed to seeing in patent cases than
in copyright 3 2-and its negative reference to the white pages as "typical" and "garden variety'" 3 -terms that undoubtedly could be applied
to a number of other directories and factual compilations. On the other

29. Id. at 1289.
30. Id. at 1294.
31. Id. at 1296 (emphasis added).
32. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
33. by
Feist,
11I S. Ct. 1991
at 1296.
Published
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hand, the Court offered some reassurance by agreeing that "novelty is
not required"; a compiler may use a selection or arrangement that
others have used before.34
Still, despite these reservations, for the overwhelming majority of
factual compilations Feist does not appear to signal the death knell of
copyright protection. But perhaps the more disturbing aspect of Feist is
its dicta regarding infringement of factual compilations. The Court
suggested that in most cases, the copyright in a compilation does not
provide much protection. The Court emphasized that "copyright in a
factual compilation is thin. Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to use the facts contained in another's
publication to aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the competing work does not feature the same selection and arrangement." 35
Indeed, the Court concluded that copyright advances the progress of
science and art precisely because second-comers are free to copy the
36
facts compiled by the original author.
Feist thus can be read as a potential threat for fact works, but
most such works presumably will be at least nominally untouched by
the ruling; they will continue to receive protection. The key question,
however, is how much protection they receive. The result, as a practical
matter, may be a Feistian bargain: yes-you can get a copyright, but
no-it's not worth very much. To the degree that a compiler seeks protection, he or she must find it in the way in which the facts are selected
and arranged in the compilation; the facts qua facts are fair game for
any potential competitors.
II.

POST-FEIST CASES

However, although Feist, read in isolation, may justify a gloomy
forecast for factual compilations, the handful of lower court cases that
have attempted to apply its lessons in the few months since it was
handed down have failed to justify such pessimism. Indeed, it is submitted that each of those cases, with one noteworthy exception, would
likely have had the same result even before Feist-except possibly in
those circuits that had accepted the "sweat of the brow" theory.
Of the nine appellate cases involving compilations or related issues
since Feist, 7 the courts found that the works in question were copy-

34. Id. at 1294.
35. Id. at 1289.
36. Id. at 1290.
37. Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509 (2d
Cir. 1991); Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471
(11th Cir. 1991); Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, vacated and reh'g en
banc granted, 949 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1991); Sem-Torq v. K-Mart, 936 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991);
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/19
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rightable in five cases, including two involving yellow pages directothe most vulnerable form of compilation after
ries 38-presumably
Feist. A compilation of state tariffs for pay telephones was also held to
be copyrightable, 39 as was a pitching form-a blank form containing
nine categories of statistics as to a pitcher's performance, used in predicting the likelihood of a victory in his next start.4 0
The cases rejecting copyrightability included one which involved
not compilations, but simple double-sided plastic signs that would not
qualify for copyright under the most liberal standard,4 1 one involving a
simple, standard chart containing data derived from horse race winnings that was used in "numbers" games,"2 another white pages case
that the Supreme Court had remanded following Feist,4 3 and a case
(later vacated) involving television broadcasts, where the court suggested that a network could register the copyright in its entire broadcast day only as a compilation, and that such registration could not
protect "the various news stories, prerecorded segments, interviews, and
weather reports presented in newscasts [which] clearly constitute preexisting, collected and assembled materials that are factual in nature."4 4 With the exception of the subsequently vacated Cable News
case,4" the results in each of these cases would have been expected even
before Feist, and none of them should be a cause of concern for publishers of factual compilations. The horse racing chart case,"' for example, involved a compilation of information gleaned from horse racing
statistics used in charts to assist in gambling. Because such charts are
common, because all charts use the same format, and because the information in all the charts is the same-it consists of the same set of
objective statistics-the court held that the chart was not copyright-

Kregos v. the Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991); Victor Lalli Enters., Inc. v. Big Red
Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1991); Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelly
Info. Publishing, Inc., 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines and Co., 932
F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1991); United States Payphone, Inc. v. Executives Unlimited of Durham, Inc.,
931 F.2d 888 (table, unpublished opinion) 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2049 (4th Cir. 1991);.
38. Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 509; Bellsouth, 933 F.2d at 952.
39. United States Payphone, 931 F.2d 888 (table, unpublished opinion), 18 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 2049.
40. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 700. In a non-compilation case, Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer
California,the court upheld the copyrightability of a fabric design involving a pattern based on a
rendering of a rose, applying Feist's originality test. 937 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991).
-41. Sem-Torq, 936 F.2d at 852.
42. Victor Lalli Enters., Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 672 (2d Cir. 1991).
43. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines and Co., 932 F.2d 610, 610 (7th Cir. 1991).
44. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471,
1485 (11th Cir. 1991).
45. Id. And-in those circuits accepting "sweat of the brow," the white pages case. Illinois
Bell, 932 F.2d 610.
46. byVictor
Lalli, 936 1991
F.2d at 671.
Published
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able. It was a purely mechanical operation, with no opportunity for
variation and not even minimal originality. As a result, the defendant
was permitted to photocopy the plaintiff's chart and publish it in the
defendant's newspaper.
Thus, Feist does not appear to have had a revolutionary effect on
the law governing copyrightability of fact works-except in those circuits where industrious collection had been deemed sufficient to justify
copyright. The lesson of the pre-Feist cases in circuits rejecting "sweat
of the brow" was that compilations will be protected only to the degree
that they consist of an original selection, coordination or arrangement
of material. " The Second Circuit was already speaking of a "modicum
of selection, coordination, or arrangement" -and of a "rather broad
copyrightability standard of originality which is phrased in terms of
'independent creation,' "48 indicating that the threshold was low, but it
was still a threshold that must be met. It was also judging compilations
by asking what other facts about the subject matter of the compilation
could be included or might conceivably be useful to a potential consumer, in order to determine the degree of selectivity involved. Essentially, in determining whether there was any protectible authorship the
court was asking to what degree the compilation was a product of
someone's judgment. Especially if there was subjective judgment involved, the work was more likely to be protected.
However, true to the intimations in Feist, even for those compilations that were found to be copyrightable; the post-Feist courts have
not always found that the copyrights offered much protection. In Key
Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises, Inc.,49
the court found that the defendant's yellow pages directory for the
New York Chinese-American community did not infringe the plain-

47. . Compare Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984) with Financial
Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Service, 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984), affd on reh'g, 808
F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986) - two of the leading pre-Feist compilation cases in the Second Circuit.
Eckes involved a guide to baseball cards that singled out 5,000 of the 18,000 cards as "premium"
cards and gave the author's estimation of the going market price for each card based on whether
the card was in mint, very good to excellent or fair to good condition. Eckes, 736 F.2d at 860. The
court found that it was copyrightable, focussing on the list of premium cards and concluding that
it was the product of selection, creativity and judgment. Id. at 863. Financial Information involved index cards containing five items of factual information about all U.S. municipal bond
redemptions (such as the issuer of the bond, the series of bonds, the date and price of the redemption, and the name of the trustee or paying agent). Financial Info., 751 F.2d at 502; Financial
Info., 808 F.2d at 205. The court concluded that the cards were not copyrightable because all that
was involved was a simple clerical task of culling through newspapers and extracting the five items
of information about all municipal bond redemptions, with no discretion or independent creation
involved. FinancialInfo., 808 F.2d at 208.
48. FinancialInfo., 751 F.2d at 507.
49. 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/19
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tiff's Chinese-American yellow pages. In Kregos v. The Associated
Press,"0 the court simply found that there was an issue of fact as to
whether the plaintiff's form was sufficiently original to enjoy copyright
and expressed serious doubts whether this meant the plaintiff would
obtain "much of a victory" since it was entitled to only limited protection. "If someone else displays the requisite creativity by making a selection that differs in more than a trivial degree, Kregos cannot
complain.""
However, the results in cases such as Key Publicationsand Kregos
should not necessarily trouble most publishers of fact works. Again,
those cases probably would have been decided the same way even
before Feist. In Key Publications, although 1,500 of the defendant's
2,000 listings were also in the plaintiff's directory, the court noted that
the plaintiff's directory had 9,000 listings overall. Thus, the defendant
had used only one-sixth of the plaintiff's listings. Moreover, given the
subject matter of the two directories, considerable overlap was inevitable. In addition, the arrangement was quite different: the plaintiff had
more than 260 categories; the defendant had only 28 with only 3 duplicates of categories in the plaintiff's directory.
The pitching form in Kregos was hardly a work of great originality, and it existed in a crowded field of similar works. If Kregos had a
copyright, it was only because nobody else had used all nine of his categories of pitching performance, although most of them had been used
elsewhere. Thus, in noting that a form that contained six of his nine
categories-but also had four additional categories-may well not be
infringing, the court was simply recognizing that a work that is barely
copyrightable is entitled only to relatively bare protection.
In contrast to cases such as Key Publications and Kregos, cases
such as Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelly Information Pub., Inc.52 and United States Payphone, Inc. v. Executives
Unlimited of Durham, Inc.53 have found that the defendants' compilations did infringe the plaintiffs' works. Thus far, copyright protection
for fact compilations, including even yellow pages telephone directories,
appears to be alive and well. As the Second Circuit said in Key Publications, "[w]hile, as the Court pointed out in Feist, the 'copyright in a
factual compilation is thin,' 5 we do not believe it is anorexic." 55

50. 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
51. Id. at 710.
52. 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991).
53. 931 F.2d 888 (table; unpublished opinion), 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2049 (4th Cir 1991).
54. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1289 (interim ed.
1991).
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The only post-Feist case that has seen Feist as revolutionizing the
law of copyright is the recent opinion of a panel of the Eleventh Circuit's in Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Services of
America, Inc. (subsequently vacated). 6 The panel in Cable News (unlike the Eleventh Circuit panel in Bellsouth) was persuaded that Feist
signalled a shift away from a focus on the proprietary nature of copyright, in favor of dissemination of information and ideas. The court
used this as a philosophical basis for concluding that CNN had no
copyright in the news of the day, which apparently includes CNN's
own news clips and its own reports of the news. The primary issue was
the scope of injunctive relief-whether an injunction can be issued
against infringement of an unregistered work-a necessity for a broadcaster attempting to enjoin future infringements of its future broadcasts. Although that issue did not seem to be implicated in Feist, the
court nevertheless found that Feist had so "clarified the law of copyright" that it had "removed any doubt concerning the appropriate
scope of injunctive relief."' 57 Such doubts were apparently removed because one cannot tell whether a work will satisfy constitutional prerequisites for copyright until it has been created. While the court's conclusion on that point may be theoretically sound, it seems utterly divorced
from the practical realities of the broadcasting world.
The practical difficulties inherent in such a ruling may not have
bothered the court because it apparently did not believe that CNN's
broadcasts in general deserve copyright protection. This was due in
part to the court's concern that "in an age when the broadcast media
represent the source of news for so many citizens, thoughtful consideration must be afforded to the public interest." 58 In other words, the more
important one's work is, the more dangerous it is to give it copyright
protection. 9
The most pertinent observation by the Cable News court for our
purposes is its statement that CNN's copyright registration for its entire broadcast day necessarily is "in the nature of a compilation which
would include many segments, usually prerecorded, as to which it
would have no claim of copyright. 6 0n One reason it would have no
copyright claim in those segments was that "[a]fter Feist it cannot be
55. Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 574
(2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Feist, 11l S. Ct. at 1289).
56. 940 F.2d 1471 vacated, 949 F.2d 378 (1lth Cir. 1991).
57. Id. at 1477.
58. Id. at 1484.
59. Cf. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1984) ("If
every volume that was in the public interest could be pirated away by a competing publisher . . .
the public [soon] would have nothing worth reading.") (alterations in original).
60. Cable News, 940 F.2d at 1484-85.
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assumed that every newscast would qualify for even compilation copyright status. Indeed, Feist places such a conclusion in serious doubt."6 1
The court apparently came to this conclusion because Feist had made
the unremarkable observation that facts are not subject to copyright.
Therefore, according to the Cable News court, prerecorded segments,
interviews, and weather reports that are factual in nature cannot be
protected by copyright. Only the selection, coordination and arrangement of those segments would be copyrightable.
This appears to be a curious ruling, since much of CNN's news
day does consist of original programming. Moreover, although the news
and weather reports, interviews and prerecorded segments may be factual in nature, that should not deprive those segments in and of themselves of copyright protection. The facts related in those segments may
be in the public domain, but the particular expression of those facts,
including the news commentator's commentary and the visual images
filmed by the broadcaster, would seem to be clearly copyrightable.
A petition for rehearing, in the Cable News case, supported by
amici curiae from a number of major media companies and organizations, was granted by the Eleventh Circuit en banc and the panel's
opinion was vacated.5 2 If the court is not persuaded to rethink its decision, and if that decision is followed by other courts, there may well be
reason to believe that Feist is responsible for a revolution in the copyright world. But for the moment, Cable News stands alone in its interpretation of Feist. There is reason to hope that it is nothing more than
an aberration, and that the other post-Feist cases more accurately reflect the.impact (or non-impact) of Feist.
Thus, if there is a lesson to be learned from the post-Feist cases
thus far, it is that Feist may not portend a major retreat from copyright protection for works such as factual compilations. Feist's focus on
originality of selection, coordination and arrangement is nothing new,
and publishers have long had to cope with that standard of copyrightability. Publishers have also been aware that a second 'comer who
chooses to publish a similar compilation but goes to the trouble of using
different principles of selection and arrangement will probably be able
to do so with impunity. Feist's statement that protection for factual
compilations is "thin" was not a revelation, but simply a confirmation.
III.

PRESCRIPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

It is healthy and perhaps necessary to speculate on how to perfect
our copyright system. We expect no less from our legal scholars. But

61.

Id. at 1485 n.23.
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from a practitioner's point of view, it is dangerous to propose tampering
with a system that thus far does not seem to have required major repairs. Indeed, if the foregoing analysis is correct, it is fair to ask
whether there is a need to consider any major changes in our copyright
(or other) laws to accommodate publishers' understandable desires for
some degree of protection for their factual compilations and similar
works. The answer to that question depends, in part, on whether one
believes that such works deserve protection, or how much protection
they deserve. The prescriptions that some of the participants in this
symposium offer appear to conclude that if such works deserve protection, it should not (or cannot) be under the rubric of copyright-or at
best, it should be as one of copyright's stepchildren.
Assuming that the Supreme Court has not effectively disowned
factual compilations from the copyright family, there would appear to
be no good reason to seek another safe harbor. Nor would it seem necessary or desirable to accept what amounts to a two-tiered system of
copyright which grants nominal copyright protection to "low authorship" works but in reality gives them minimal protection. Even after
Feist, most factual compilations are protected against more than mere
literal copying, as Feist's focus on selection, coordination and arrangement makes clear.
Regardless of whether Feist has brought about fundamental
changes in our system of protection for factual compilations, we should
not lose sight of the fact that thus far, the system has worked rather
well. Our information industry is thriving in ways that may have been
only vaguely foreseen when the Copyright Act was revised in 1976.
Copyright, in its pre-Feistian form, cannot be condemned as stifling the
development of new and easily accessible forms of information. Those
who criticize the status quo ante Feist do so despite the progress that
was enjoyed under that system. Even where "sweat of the brow" prevailed, it does not appear that the information explosion was seriously
hindered.
In short, the constitutional justification for copyright, to "promote'
the Progress of Science and useful Arts,' ' 3 appears to have been
served. Those who question the constitutionality of copyright protection
for fact works must rely on something other than empirical evidence.
IV.

HISTORY, CONSTITUTIONALITY AND COPYRIGHT

We are fortunate at this symposium to have the benefit of an informative and interesting exposition of the historical background of the
Copyright Clause of the Constitution. It is particularly helpful to those
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
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of us whose fate it is to spend our days practicing copyright law rather
than studying it and researching its history and theory. Law is, of
course, a product of history, especially in our system based on the common law. We cannot completely understand the nature and scope of
current law -whether we are addressing copyright, patent, criminal,
contract, or any other area of the law-if we do not understand its
history.
Nevertheless, each of us can look at the same history and learn
different lessons from it, either by focusing on different aspects, events
or historical periods, or by viewing it through the prism of his or her
own philosophy or perspective. Nowhere in the field of legal history and
doctrine is that more true than in the continuing debate over American
constitutional doctrine-a debate that is reopened every time there is a
nomination to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court.
Granted, the great constitutional debates of the past and present
do not seem to have paid much attention to copyright. Ours is not a
field that seems to arouse great controversy in the public arena, and the
debates that we have witnessed among practitioners, academics, industries and others with an interest in copyright do not often rise to the
level of constitutional analysis. Of course, Feist may force us to reexamine the constitutional foundations of copyright, and at this symposium we certainly have the benefit of a proyocative, considered and
well-expressed approach to review current issues from that perspective.
It is, of course, not the only approach, and not-everyone who reviews that history will draw the same conclusions. The lessons one
learns from history are often only the lessons one wants to learn. The
author of this paper, for example, represents (among others) proprietors of what at least one paper at this symposium has labelled "neocopyrights." It is only natural that a lawyer whose clients hope to
programs,
computer
for
enhance-protection
maintain-even
databases, compilations and other works of what has been disparagingly labeled "low authorship," would draw different conclusions than
someone who represents businesses with conflicting interests. In that
context, it is fair to note that the clients of one of this symposium's
critics of works of "low authorship" have included companies accused
of infringing copyrights in the products of new technology that he contends deserve a lesser degree of protection than traditional works of
authorship.64 The point is not to discredit any particular person's analysis, but simply to state the obvious: that most of us who take positions

64.

See, e.g., Pacific & Southern Company, Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1493 (11 th Cir.
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on the issues we are discussing are likely to be influenced by our own
interests or those of our clients.
A.

The Constitutional Scope of Protection

The Copyright Clause of the Constitution briefly and simply ,gives
Congress its power:
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.6 6
Much has been read into these words by courts and commentators
over the years. The very brevity and simplicity of the clause permits
the proponent of just about any point of view to find support for that
view in the constitutional language. However, it would be a mistake to
read the clause restrictively. And certainly, attempts to read factual
compilations and similar works-as well as works made possible by
new technologies-out of the constitutional scope of copyright seem
both belated and misguided.
B.

Protectionfor Fact Works

To attempt to exclude fact works from copyright protection is to
ignore the historical roots of copyright in this nation. The very first
copyright statute" protected maps and charts-which are as factual as
works can be. The fact that our first Congress chose to include these as
subjects of copyright would seem to be dispositive of any argument that
fact works are constitutionally barred from copyright.
When, over a century ago, the Supreme Court ruled that photographs are copyrightable subject matter, it observed that the first Congress of the United States, "sitting immediately after the formation of
the Constitution," enacted the first copyright statute providing that
"authors of any map, chart, book or books" were entitled to copyright.6 7 The Court noted that in fact the statute mentioned maps and
charts before it mentioned books. It concluded that:
the construction placed upon the Constitution by the first act of 1790,
and by the act of 1802, by the men who were contemporary with its
formation, many of whom were members of the convention which
framed it, is of itself entitled to very great weight, and when it is
remembered that the rights thus established have not been disputed during a period of nearly a century, it is almost conclusive. 8
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
66. Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124, § I.
67. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, III U.S. 53, 56 (1883).
68. Id.
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Thus, it seems clear that fact works are not disqualified from
copyright.
C. Protectionfor Products of New Technology
On the other hand, while one can invoke history in defense of
copyright protection, one should not be enslaved by history in denying
protection to new forms of works. As Learned Hand wisely remarked
seventy years ago, the constitutional grant of power to enact copyright
legislation does not "embalm[] inflexibly the habits of 1789 . . . . [I]ts
grants of power to Congress comprise, not only what was then known,
but what the ingenuity of men should devise thereafter."6 9 Moreover,
as Nimmer concludes, "the phrase 'To promote the progress of science
and useful arts . . .' must be read as largely in the nature of a preamble, indicating the purpose of the power but not in limitation of its
exercise."7
Similarly, there can be no justification for a restrictive interpretation of the references in the Copyright Clause to "writings" and "au71
thors." As the Supreme Court stated in Goldstein v. California,
the
constitutional terms "writings" and "authors" have "not been construed in their narrow literal sense but, rather, with the reach necessary
to reflect the broad scope of constitutional principals. ' 72 For example,
the Court noted, "writings" include "any physical rendering of the
'73
fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor."
The legislative history-such as it is-of the Copyright Clause
does not lend support to a restrictive interpretation. As former Register
of Copyrights, Barbara Ringer has observed "[nlearly the full history
of Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution is summed up in the
Federalist #43," which in one paragraph states that copyright is a right
at common law and that the public good fully coincides with the claims
of individuals to copyright.7 One can certainly find justification for
comprehensive and widespread protection for a vast array of works in
that brief justification of the Copyright Clause-just as one can undoubtedly find justification for a more restrictive approach. Again, the
nature and purpose of copyright may be in the eye of the beholder.

69. Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, 276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
70. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, §1.03 [A], at 1-34.
71. 412 U.S. 546 (1972).
72. Id. at 561.
73. Id. (citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 11I U.S. 53 (1883); The TradeMark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)).
74. Barbara Ringer, Two Hundred Years of American Copyright Law, in 200 YEARS OF
ENGLISH & AMERICAN PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW 117, 126 (1976) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST
43); see also
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555-56 (1972).
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The fact is that, as one knowledgeable commentator has observed,
copyright was "the result of a technological development-the invention of movable type making mechanical reproduction and with it the
wide dissemination of works of the mind possible."7' 5 In Sony Corporation v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,7" the Supreme Court was in accord
with this view: "From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed
in response to significant changes in technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying equipment-the printing press-that
7
gave rise to the original need for copyright protection." 7
78
the Court observed that
And again, in Goldstein v. California,
"[a]s our technology has expanded the means available for creative activity and provided economical means for reproducing manifestations of
such activities, new areas of federal [copyright] protection have been
79
initiated.
As a creature of a once-new technology, copyright has not stood
frozen in time. As newer technologies have appeared over time, copyright has expanded to include within its ambit photographs, motion pictures, sound recordings, radio, television, computers and other telecommunications. In each case, our copyright law has had little difficulty in
incorporating the new form of expression into the existing framework.
There is no reason why the newest forms of storing and expressing information and ideas cannot also fit comfortably within the copyright
framework. Indeed, for the most part they already have.
Does Feist signal a new era in the law of copyright-a return to
an "original intent" of creating copyright solely as a means of insuring
wide access to and dissemination of knowledge, even against the author's will? It is submitted that such a question is premature at best.
Feist may or may not be-as one of our participants has suggested-the most important Supreme Court copyright case since its
first. Only time will tell. But it is worth noting that in recent times the
Supreme Court has elaborated on the meaning of the Copyright Clause
in a way that demonstrates that it is meant to serve a number of interests, including that of the author. In Sony, 80 Justice Stevens echoed
Justice Stewart's earlier words: 8

Stephen M. Stewart, Two Hundred Years of English Copyright Law, in 200
& AMERICAN PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW 81, 82 (1976).
76. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
77. Id.
78. 412 U.S. 546 (1972).
79. Id. at 562.
80. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/19
81. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
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The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the
limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve
the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and
the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a
fair return for an "author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by
this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.
"The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly," this Court has said, "lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors." When technological
change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must
be construed in light of this basic purpose. 82
The decision of the court of appeals in Sony, although reversed,
nevertheless stated a compelling interpretation of the Copyright Clause
when it noted that despite some authorities' statement that the author's
interest in securing an economic reward for his labors is "a secondary
consideration," the real purpose of the Clause is to encourage works of
the intellect. The court noted that this purpose is achieved by relying
on the economic incentives granted to authors and inventors by the
copyright scheme, which relies on the author to promote the progress of
science by permitting him to control the cost of and access to his novelty. 83 The Supreme Court's reversal did not question this reading of
the Copyright Clause; indeed, the passage from the Supreme Court decision quoted above is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's exposition.
D. Progress in Science: A Limitation?
It has been suggested that the Copyright Clause requires the widest possible public access to works that are protected by copyright because of its goal of promoting progress in science. This writer does not
pretend to compete with the expertise of legal scholars in the common
law and constitutional history of copyright. Nevertheless, one is
tempted to ask whether equating "science"-the progress of which is a
stated goal of the Copyright Clause-with "learning" is necessarily the
only permissible interpretation. 84 It is not self-evident that when the
Framers spoke of "science," they equated it with "the encouragement
of learning" mentioned in the Statute of Anne. It is not clear that "sci82. Sony, 464 U.S. at 431-32 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151, 156 (1978).
83. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd,
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
84. Moreover, even if "science" did mean "learning," it does not necessarily follow that a
copyrighted work must be made accessible to all as part of the bargain for granting it protection.
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ence" necessarily meant "learning" in the 1780's, although that certainly was one definition of the term. "Science" also meant "knowledge," 8 5 a closely related term, but one that does not necessarily imply
immediate and wide dissemination of the knowledge in question.
There is also some reason to doubt whether the constitutional goal
of satisfying the public's "right to learn" is the only goal underlying the
Copyright Clause. The constitutional purpose to "promote the progress
of science and useful arts" that underlies our copyright and patent system clearly includes the notion that the public interest will be served by
encouraging authors to create and inventors to invent. A major way in
which the public interest is served is by giving the public access to a
work by means of publication. But that is not the only way in which
authors' exclusive rights may serve the progress of science and useful
arts. A work need not be published in order to contribute to cultural or
scientific progress. Protecting J.D. Salinger's private writings serves the
public interest even if Salinger decides never to publish them." First, it
recognizes his right of privacy--certainly a worthy goal. Moreover, it
encourages him to permit the deposit of his private writings in archives
and libraries where scholars will have access to them. If there were no
right of first publication, privacy-seeking authors would shy away from
permitting their unpublished works to be made available to scholars,
since they would lose control over the consequences of such access. If a
J.D. Salinger wants to limit the use to which scholars may put his writings, that is a better-bargain than denying access altogether.
By the same token, the author who puts away his unpublished
manuscript today may pick it up years from now and finish the uncompleted novel or unfinished symphony, producing a work for publication
that might never have been completed if the general public had a right
of access to his earlier, unpublished version.
Another example of progress in science and useful arts, notwithstanding failure to publish, is the common practice among software
manufacturers of publishing computer programs only in object code
and closely guarding the source code. Computer programs have revolutionized the way we do business, interact and communicate. In most
cases, the programs we use are available to us in object code form only.
This does not diminish the positive impact they have on our lives.
Moreover, permitting copyright owners to maintain exclusive rights
over the unpublished source code serves the constitutional purpose of

85. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670, 683 (Ct. Cl.
1972) ("The word 'Science' is used in the sense of general knowledge rather than the modern
sense of physical or biological science."), rev'd on other grounds, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
affid by equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975)
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/19
86. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1990).
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encouraging them to create copyrightable works and make them available to the public. The security of knowing that the source code is inaccessible encourages wide dissemination of programs in object code-the
only form in which the user of the program has a legitimate need for
the software.
Recognizing the right of an author not to publish (or the author's
right to decide when to publish) does not defeat the purpose of satisfying the public's right to learn. Even if an author decides never to publish a work, the right to prevent publication is limited, most significantly by the durational limit of copyright. Under the 1976 Act, even
an unpublished work will eventually enter the public domain. This is, in
fact, an improvement over the common law copyright, which recognized a perpetual right of first publication. The question posed in law
school copyright classes about the discovery of an unpublished play by
Shakespeare may be all too typically hypothetical, but it illustrates the
potentially drastic reach of common law copyright, which theoretically
would give the copyright owner the right of first publication even 400
years after the play was written.8 7 The 1976 Act better serves the interest of public dissemination by cutting off the right of first publication
fifty years after the death of the author. 88 Even Shakespeare's newly
discovered play would finally enter the public domain no later than the
year 2002.89 Incorporating the common law right of first publication
into the federal copyright scheme therefore serves the constitutional
purpose that its very critics claim to be defending.
Moreover, it is not entirely clear that the Copyright and Patent
Clause's reference to "useful arts" was intended to apply only to patents, or that its reference to "science" was intended to apply only to
copyrights. On at least one occasion, the Supreme Court has indicated
that Congress was empowered to legislate on copyright matters in order
to promote the useful arts.90
It is not enough to say that the Copyright Clause is intended to
promote dissemination of knowledge. The fact is that in order to promote the progress of science and useful arts, it is necessary to give authors the incentive to create. That is why copyrights-by their very
nature a form of monopoly-exist. One cannot, therefore, simply argue
87. Of course, a major problem with the hypothetical Shakespeare question is in determining who the owner of the common law copyright would be. There is no logical reason to believe
that it would be the person who discovered the work. It is well-accepted that ownership of a copy
of a work does not confer ownership of the copyright in that work. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1988).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 303. This is true unless it is published before 2002. In the latter case,
copyright would subsist until the 'year 2027.
90. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 299 (1903) (Holmes, J.); see
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that since progress in knowledge is the ultimate goal of copyright, any
exercise of copyrights that impedes access to knowledge must be unconstitutional. The copyright law reflects a balance between the goal of
disseminating knowledge to society at large and the author's natural
desire to reap the economic benefits and control the dissemination of
his work. That the latter is ultimately subject to the former is clear, but
that does not mean that the author must inevitably and invariably yield
to the interest in public access. Rather, we grant the author exclusive
rights in his or her work for a limited period of time precisely in order
to encourage him or her to produce the work, confident in the knowledge that ultimately, the work will enter the public domain. The public
makes a bargain with the author: in exchange for giving him or her a
limited monopoly on his or her work for the short term, the public obtains the work in the long run.
As Nimmer notes, the interest in "free access to the materials essential to the development of society" is served by limiting the period of
time in which the copyright owner retains the exclusive right to his or
her writings. 9 In fact, under what Nimmer calls the "currently prevailing view," the "introductory phrase of the Copyright Clause does not
require that each of the 'writings' protected by copyright in fact promote science or useful arts, but only that Congress shall be promoting
' As Nimmer notes, the Fifth
these ends by its copyright legislation." 92
Circuit has observed that it would be permissible for Congress to conclude that the best way to promote creativity is not to impose any governmental restrictions on the subject matter of copyrightable works. 93
This philosophy was endorsed by the Eleventh Circuit in Pacific &
Southern Co. v. Duncan,94 where the court rejected a video monitoring
service's contention that a television broadcaster's copyrights in its new
programming did not further the ends of the Copyright Clause since it
systematically destroyed its broadcast videotapes and deprived the public of the benefits of its creative efforts. The court of appeals agreed
that the Constitution permits Congress to enact copyright legislation
only if it benefits society as a whole rather than authors alone. But the
court noted that "this does not mean that every copyright holder must
offer benefits to society, for the copyright is an incentive rather than a
command. And, a fortiori, the copyright holder need not provide the
most complete public access possible." 9 5 The court also observed that

91. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 1.05 [D], at 1-36.7.
92. Id. § 1.03 [B], at 1-35.
93. Id. (citing Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th
Cir. 1979)).
94. 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/19
95. Id. at 1499.
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"[slince authors most often profit by distributing their works to the
public, society usually benefits." 90
E.

Copyright for Performances

Another criticism that has been voiced about current copyright
law at this symposium is that works such as television broadcasts and
computer programs are processes for performing-not publishing-works. That criticism is accurate as far as it goes, but it ignores
the fact that by the late twentieth century-if not
before-"publishing" as a practical matter encompasses a number of
activities and processes that were not and could not have been foreseen
in 1789. By that time,ihewspapers had become "the-center of literary
influence in the colonies."9 Ideas and facts were expressed in and disseminated by means of the printed word. In contrast, today we are
told-perhaps regrettably-that television is the primary source of
news for the majority of Americans. Television (e.g., network and local
newscasts, and now CNN) has to a large degree displaced newspapers
in the function of disseminating the news. The fact that the nightly
news is not "published" in a traditional sense, but rather is "performed" by being broadcast over the airwaves, should not result in acknowledging copyright protection for The New York Times, but denying it for the McNeil-Lehrer Report-or even the McLaughlin Report.
The distinction between "publishing" and performance is totally artificial-an artifact from a time when information could be disseminated
to the masses only by means of the printed word.
The same advances in communications technology have created a
situation in which motion pictures and television programs have to a
degree supplanted books and the written word as a means of entertainment. Two hundred years ago, someone with a thirst for fiction would
pick up a book. Today, he or she is just as likely to go to the movies or
turn .on the television. Again, we may lament such a shift in preferences, but is the answer to deny copyright protection for the such "performances"? As a practical matter, the motion picture (even before the
age of videocassettes) and the television situation comedy are published
works; they are a twentieth century equivalent of their earlier written
counterparts. The pragmatist is therefore tempted to dismiss the argument that the Framers of the Copyright Clause did not intend to include a performance right among the rights Congress was empowered
to grant to authors, if for no other reason because the nature of that
right has changed over the past 200 years.

96.

Id. n.14 (emphasis added).
at 123.
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The fact that a work that is "performed" rather than "published"
may be subject to greater control by its owner-who can limit access to
the work by deciding to perform only when he or she pleases-does not
really distinguish such works from any other copyrightable work. An
author of a conventional book is not required by the copyright law to
have it published in as many copies as the public demands. It may be
that the laws of economics provide an incentive for such wide dissemination, but that is not necessarily true with respect to all copyrightable
works. The most obvious example is a work of art. A great artist generally makes only one copy of each of his paintings. He or she may or
may not permit prints of the paintings to be made for mass distribution, but nothing in the copyright law compels such reproduction.
Copyright exists for the single work of art that sits in a private collection or for the limited edition of lithographs, just as it exists for works
that receive the broadest possible dissemination.
F.

Work for Hire

Copyright also exists for the work for hire. Nothing in the Constitution or in common sense is offended by the work for hire doctrine. In
areas other than copyright, we have no difficulty in understanding that
an employee who manufactures a good for his employer does not own
that good. Rather, the employer owns all rights. There is no reason why
the same should not be true with respect to works of authorship. Moreover, particularly in this day and age, when works such as motion pictures, computer programs and databases are created by the collaborative efforts of large numbers of persons, work for hire resolves the
practical problem of determining who is the author and owner of a
work when it might be very difficult, if not impossible, to attribute authorship to a single person or even to an identifiable group of persons.
Indeed, one wonders whether such works, many of which require investments of large sums of money, would be made if the employer were
not assured that it would retain ownership of the final product. While
the concept of work for hire may be aesthetically offensive to one's romantic notions of the writer in his garret or the artist in her loft, work
for hire reflects the realities of much of the modern creative process.
G.

Misappropriation

It has been suggested that if Feist has removed protection from
factual compilations and similar works, they can nevertheless be salvaged by reviving notions of misappropriation. But it would be a mistake to read Feist as rejecting antimisappropriation policies as a basis
for copyright protection. It is hoped that the foregoing analysis has
demonstrated that copyright can serve multiple purposes, and that prohttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/19
tection of the fruits of an author's labor is certainly one of those pur-
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poses. Indeed, even an interpretation of the Copyright Clause that focuses single-mindedly only on its purpose of promoting progress in
science and the useful arts must recognize that such progress is promoted when authors are secure in the knowledge that their work will
not be stolen by others.
Thus, the plea that misappropriation not be overlooked as a basis
for protection is sensible. But the use of antimisappropriation policy as
a rationale for protecting works such as factual compilations should not
be. an excuse for abandoning protection for anything other than the
literal, complete text of a particular work. Nor should it be used as
justification for either offering protection to that which does not merit
it or reducing the protection that other works currently enjoy.
To the degree that the call for protecting factual compilations by
means of misappropriation theory is based on a reading of Feist as denying copyright protection to such compilations, it has already been
suggested that such a reading may be premature. It may not be necessary to attempt to amend the Copyright Act or find another legislative
solution to salvage protection for most fact works. Further development
of the case law will offer us better guidance.
If, in the long run, Feist proves to be as fatal to such works as
some fear, it may be necessary to find another solution. Amending the
Copyright Act may not be possible if Feist is read as creating a constitutional bar on copyright for garden variety factual compilations.
Amending section 301 of the Copyright Act to permit misappropriation
claims under state law would not appear to suffer from any constitutional infirmity, but that is hardly an ideal solution to problems created
for an industry that is national in scope. Presumably, Congress could
enact noncopyright legislation under the Commerce Clause to prevent
misappropriation of works that are not entitled to copyright.
Such efforts should be made only if and when it becomes clear
that copyright can no longer offer effective protection to factual compilations. Traditional copyright law offers a long history of legislative and
judicial interpretation and generally accepted principles of copyright
jurisprudence sufficiently flexible to adapt to new technological developments. To encourage the creation of such works for the benefit of
society, they should be protected by copyright-rather than being left
to the tender mercies of some new, untested substitute. Indeed, technological advances could threaten to make any new statutory scheme obsolete almost as soon as it was enacted. It would be far better to continue the protection of factual compilations under the system of
protection that copyright offers, a system that has long proven its abilPublished
eCommons, 1991
ity tobyadapt.
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The dangers of relying on an alternative system of protection are
particularly clear with respect to those compilations-which, if we take
the Court at its word, include the vast majority of compilations-that
are still protected by copyright. Protection for selection, coordination
and arrangement is not an illusory promise.9 8 Nor is it confined to protection against literal copying. Copyright still can offer effective protection for fact works even in the post-Feist world.
In any event, the need to continue protection for factual compilations should not be used to create a whole new class of "second class
citizens" of copyright that would include both works that deserve
greater protection and lesser protection than is offered by misappropriation theory. It is far from clear whether there is a need or justification
for protecting new typographic arrangements of public domain works
and reproductions of works of fine art on the same terms as factual
compilations. Nor is there any reason to believe that works such as
computer programs, which are clearly works that pass muster under
the most stringent reading of Feist, should be diverted from the mainstream of copyright to the backwaters of a second class of protection.9 9
"Functional works," as Professor Karjala calls them, are not the same
thing as fact works and do not necessarily share the problems that fact
works have encountered.
Thus, misappropriation theory may ultimately save the day for
factual compilations, but it makes sense first to seek solutions in the
context of current copyright doctrine. A hasty solution is rarely a good
one.
V.

CONCLUSION

One of the papers presented at this symposium asks whether we
want to force authors to reinvent the wheel rather than take advantage
of the work of their predecessors. That is a question that we should ask
ourselves before deciding the fate of intellectual property protection for
works such as factual compilations. It may not be necessary to reinvent
the wheel, because in most cases copyright' 00 may still offer effective
protection.

98. See, e.g., Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelly Info. Publishing, Inc.,
933 F.2d 952 (1 1th Cir. 1991); United States Payphone, Inc. v. Executives Unlimited of Durham,
Inc., 931 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1991); Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).
99. As Professor Karjala correctly notes, this is not the forum to go deeply into the question
of the appropriate scope of protection for computer programs. Karjala, supra note 2, at 921. It
should be noted, however, that Feist's emphasis on copyright protection for selection, coordination
and arrangement fits comfortably alongside the prevailing standard of protection for the structure,
sequence and organization of computer programs.
100. As well as other already-existing means of protection, such as contractual restrictions,
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/19
technical (nonlegal) defenses to data piracy, and, in appropriate cases, trade secret law.
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995

Factual compilations should be protected. It is not clear that Feist
will result in underprotection for the majority of such works. If and
when it turns out that further steps must be taken to insure that authors of such compilations will have sufficient incentive to create them,
care should be taken that we fix only that which is broken.
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